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I 
Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways 
they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. 
Pastness is a central element in the socialization of individuals, in the mainte- 
nance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legiti- 
mation. Pastness therefore is pre-eminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a 
political phenomenon, always a contemporary phen~menon.~ 
'History from below' refers to a terrain well known to Left historians, and 
with forty years of maps and compasses and guidebooks to make us familiar 
with its structural features and its inhabitants, it might not seem to warrant a new 
exploration. But am I alone in feeling that more than ten years of theoretical 
debate and polemic has made the exact location of 'below' surprisingly vague? 
Just where is it, who occupies it, is its population growing? Who is interested in 
its past and its present? What kind of boundary separates it from its hostile 
neighbour, 'above'? What kinds of reconnoitering would make more effective 
our strategic interventions on its behalf? This essay is an attempt to look toward 
the future of the subaltern past. 
Two premises about the relationship between historiography and politics 
would seem to underlie the project of 'history from below,' and they lead me to 
a sketch of an argument. The first premise, that historiography has political 
effects, should be uncontroversial among Left historians. We do not simply 
remember; we are reminded, and this reminding may serve to construct or to 
undo political solidarities, to legitimate or to undermine existing institutions, to 
induce quiescence or to incite action. It is this moral and political dimension of 
historiography, acutely delineated by Immanuel Wallerstein in the passage 
quoted above, that places a special burden on the Left historian, who, as Walter 
Benjamin put it, must strive "to wrest tradition away from the conformism that 
is about to overpower it" and "to fan the spark of hope in the past,"3 that is, to 
inspire and guide political action. It is this moral and political dimension of 
historiography that informed the earliest work in 'history from below,' and that 
continues to make debates about the principles that guide our practice - on the 
relative efficacy of things and representations, for example, or on the relative 
merits of women's history and gender history - of such pressing importance to us. 
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If we share the view that historiography is and should be political, a second 
(perhaps more controversial) premise underlying 'history from below' is that 
both the production of historical knowledge and its political effects are context- 
sensitive. 'Presentism,' like political commitment, may be an epithet hurled at 
some historians by their more 'objective' colleagues. Too explicit a reference to 
the plays of power and interest in the present, it seems to some, give away our 
pretensions to 'neutrality' and 'truth.' It might reveal that which seeks to hide, as 
de Certeau has put it, "behind the picture of a past, the present that produces and 
organizes it.04 The concerns of the historian about the past, however, are always 
formulated in a present. In Wallerstein's words, pastness is "always a contem- 
porary phenomenon"; in Greg Dening's, "histories always have this double 
entendre. They refer to a past in making a p re~en t . "~  Or as Benjamin puts it, the 
historian must "seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger." 
Just which memory flashes up will vary from one moment of danger to another. 
Our present is, I assume most would agree, quite a different moment of danger 
than that faced by Thompson, Hobsbawm, Rud6 and other creators of the genre 
of 'history from below.' 
While I will emphasize in much of the discussion below the contrast 
between our moment of danger and earlier ones, I want to make clear what I 
think has not changed. Whatever "post-" might apply either to our theory or our 
era, we do not inhabit a "post-subordination" world. Whatever revisions we 
might have made, then, in our explanations of social causality or in our models 
for economic restructuring or in our confidence in our own powers to know, the 
moral core of our commitment to redress subordination did not disappear along 
with a wall or an empire or a 'science.' That line across which, in the words of 
one seventeenth-century Ranter, "your slavery is their liberty, your poverty is 
their p r o ~ ~ e r i t y , " ~  should provoke our action as readily today as it did a decade, 
a generation, centuries ago. 
The current socio-political context nevertheless differs in important ways 
from that of the classical period of 'history from below' in the 1950s and 60s, 
and from the period of its expansion and revision in the 1970s and 80s. New 
configurations of global capitalism, mass migration and mass mediation have 
fundamentally re-shaped the terrain on which politics -including the politics of 
historical knowledge -is conducted.' This suggests a new project for historians 
on the Left. Given that Left historiography is and should be political and presen- 
tist, and that subordinations demand redress, the questions I consider in the 
pages that follow are these: How might we achieve a more effective praxis of 
knowledge-politics? What sort of Left historiography might contribute to an 
effective political response to the practices of subordination which so deeply 
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divide our "globalized" society? How should we "seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up" at this particular moment of danger? How might historians help to 
construct membership in a group-for-itself which will struggle effectively 
against subordination in all of its forms? 
The particular point of re-thinking I suggest is a thorough-going question- 
ing of the practice of taking the national as natural. The great preponderance of 
historiography, from widely divergent theoretical and political perspectives, 
nevertheless shares an often tacit reliance on the nation andlor the nation-state 
as its fundamental organizing principle.8 A quick perusal of the deployment of 
state-based nouns (do they mean to imply homogeneity?) or state-based adjec- 
tives in the titles of books, articles, journals, and university courses, in the orga- 
nization of book reviews or the delineation of 'fields' for mastery by graduate 
students, or in the Library of Congress cataloging categories, might show us 
how difficult it is to escape this system of organizing pastness. Moreover, this is 
often as true of socialist, feminist, black, aboriginal, or post-colonial 'history 
from below' as it is of liberal and conservative 'history from above.' While many 
historians, then, have not had deliberately nationalist purposes, we may not 
assume that, without the purposes, the practices don't follow. But do socialist 
historians see the same state categories from below that their liberal and conser- 
vative colleagues do from above? And are these categories perhaps fetishized 
constructions which now impede emancipatory politics? 
The members of the Communist Party Historians' Group in post-war 
Britain worked to develop a Marxist interpretation of English history, thus 
extending a line of historiography that had begun with A. L. Morton's A People S 
History of England (1938). This body of work was intended not only to include 
subaltern actors, but to show elite action from a subaltern perspective, and 
sometimes to show it to a subaltern audience. It has served to 'remind' readers 
that those who did not hold political and economic power in the past were never- 
theless historical agents from whose actions both lessons and inspiration might 
be drawn.9 The History Workshop movement demonstrated that the subaltern 
could not only make history but could make historiography as well. Their 
History Workslzop Journal, founded in 1975, represented, as Stuart Hall has put 
it, "a collective experiment in the democratization of history writing."I0 
Moreover, this democratization was to be achieved not only with respect to the 
authors of historical writing, but to the very language in which it would be writ- 
ten." One of the most notable influences of British Marxist historiography has 
been in India, where Ranajit Guha, and others, sought to mount a critique of 
Indian nationalist historiography. The independence struggle was not, Guha and 
his colleagues would demonstrate, solely an elite affair, nor was the resulting 
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post-colonial Indian state the only bounded community thinkable by, or capable 
of inspiring action from, subalterns throughout the sub-continent.'* 
But, perhaps ironically, a social history which meant to challenge a politi- 
cal history which was nationalist almost by definition, itself often selected its 
subjects, posed its questions, and framed its narratives 'nationally.' Paul Gilroy 
has pointed out that Marxist analysis, including that which influenced British 
social historians, has often understood both "modes of material production and 
political domination as exclusively national entities."I3 Thus, in E. P. 
Thompson's The Making of tlze English Working Class, we see a vivid and 
moving depiction of struggle from the subordinates' perspective, but it is, never- 
theless, 'struggle in one country.'I4 Why wouid the project of history from 
below remain so resolutely focused on England for a generation after the war? 
Might one answer be that its 'reminding' was being done when the terms of its 
subjects' inclusion and membership in British society were being pressed in new 
notions not of political but of social citizenship? Thompson's fervent belief in 
workers' capacity for democratic collective expression and action - in contrast 
both to de facto exclusions in British society and to Stalinist centralism within 
the Communist Party -informed his contribution to history from below. Part of 
this effort, however, entailed an adherence to those twin pillars of modernist 
political thought: nationality and rationality.15 Thus, although Bryan Palmer has 
reminded us of E. P. Thompson's lifelong commitment to internationalism, 
Thompson's historical works nevertheless have, as many have observed, a 
decidedly national focus.I6 In considering our current historiographical task, 
should we not askjust what it is that leads an internationalist to write national (if 
not nationalist) histories? The need to realize in our histories Thompson's inter- 
nationalist ideals is more pressing than ever, given that the nation-state cannot 
now, if it ever could, suffice in mapping the struggle against subordination. 
In the revisionist 'history from below' of the 1970s and 80s, when 'univer- 
salist' notions of citizenship were increasingly seen to be nevertheless coded 
male, white, heterosexual, 'dominant-ethnic-group,' not coincidentally we saw, 
in what may be seen as the historiographical expression of 'identity politics,' 
new forms of social history devoted not to 'the people' and its 'universal' 
expression, the working class, but to women, blacks, aboriginal peoples, colo- 
nial subjects. Many socialist historians found at least some aspects of this 
expansion of the terrain of social history to represent a dire threat to an emanci- 
patory knowledge-politics.I7 I would argue that many of the revisionist 'second- 
wave' histories from below may be seen to share in the danger of identity poli- 
tics more generally: of a new, albeit 'lower-level,' essentialism. As Lawrence 
Grossberg has put it, "a politics of identity reifies and sometimes even fetishizes 
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the differences between fractions of the population, undermining any possibil- 
ity that such fragmentation can be appropriated as a historical r e so~rce . " '~  But 
in spite of such fragmentation, in many histories the 'pieces' nevertheless 
continue to be collected in national containers. 
To understand the socio-political contexts in which these shifts in the focus 
of 'history from below' took place, we might look for parallels in the trajectories 
of other political movements. Paul Gilroy has characterized the structure of W. 
E. B. Dubois' So~ils of Black Folk as reflecting a move from struggle for an end 
to slavery (an international struggle), to struggle for an inclusive citizenship 
which would realize the United States' liberal promise (that is, a national 
project), to withdrawal and search for an autonomous social and political space 
in the face of disillusionment with that liberal promise (a sub-national 
project).'9 Peter Waterman has drawn a somewhat similar trajectory for the 
women's movement, where an initial position of exclusion from national poli- 
tics led to a lively internationalism (here he compares it with labour internation- 
alism), which was then forgone for a national andlor sub-national focus with 
'second wave' feminism.20 I would suggest that these same shifts may be seen in 
history from below. Are we necessarily stranded, then, between the Scylla of 
national and the Charybdis of sub-national essentialisms? Given that state 
membership is neither uniform in its meanings and entitlements nor stable over 
time, it would seem a poor container for social history even were a system of 
sovereign nation-states deemed to contain all the world's politics. And while 
presumptions of congruence between territory, culture and state may once have 
been part of our common sense,2' this is now much less tenable, and an 
"enabling" pastness will reflect the blurring and crossing of once taken-for- 
granted boundaries. Reorganizations of production and of consumption imply 
the need for a reorganization of historical knowledge, specifically one which 
seeks to understand and to transcend the naturalization of nationality. Moreover, 
given that the nation-state is a powerful actor in difference-production, includ- 
ing the construction of national and sub-national identities, 'historians-from- 
below' might have a particular stake in questioning its procedures and its effects, 
not least in our own work. 
My intention here is not to criticize past historians anachronistically for 
some failure of imagination or some avoidable loss of relevance. Rather, as 
Thompson sought to do, I hope to show how a reliance on naturalized categories 
can inhibit the formulation of a genuinely emancipatory project. Can we find an 
effective contemporary idiom in which to 'remind' social actors of those "sparks 
of hope" in the past which could inform a collective response to new regimes of 
subordination? These regimes cannot be effectively challenged, I argue, with 
70 Left History 5.1 
either the false boundaries and false uniformities of undifferentiated member- 
ship in a state-bounded class nor with the lingering essentialisms of identity, 
however construed. Today's historians-from-below might thus tell new stories, 
tell them in new terms, and use new (or newly valorized) methods in producing 
them. 
Arjun Appadurai has said of the current conjuncture that "as the shapes of 
cultures grow less bounded and tacit, more fluid and politicized, the work of 
cultural reproduction becomes a daily ha~ard." '~  But does this conjuncture not 
present the historian with an opportunity as well as a threat? While old narra- 
tives may have lost some of their salience, new possibilities present themselves 
for interrupting taken-for-granted hegemonies, for "wresting tradition away 
from conformism." My suggestion in this essay is that in place of subaltern 
histories which are either narrowly national or disconcertingly fragmented, we 
might present a pastness of subaltern cosmopolitanisnz, whereby the most 
crucial boundary for critique, for struggle and for redress is neither nation nor 
class, neither gender nor race, but rather simply that between dominator and 
dominated, oppressor and oppressed, wherever they may be. 
Perhaps I should clarify here my use of the terms 'subaltern' and 
'cosmopolitan.' I use the term 'subaltern' following the so-called 'Subaltern 
Studies' school of South Asian social history. In his preface to the first volume 
of this collective's work, Ranajit Guha says that "the word 'subaltern' ... stands 
for the meaning as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, that is, 'of inferior 
rank.' It will be used ... as a name for the general attribute of subordination 
[emphasis added]." He goes on to say that "subordination cannot be understood 
except as one of the constitutive terms in a binary relationship of which the other 
is dominance, for subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling 
groups, even when they rebel and rise Here I use the term 'subaltern' to 
point to all those who are on the receiving end of harm: of the violence, theft, 
exploitation, marginalization, and domination that are felt, endured and resisted 
by subordinates in widely varying social locations. 
I use the term 'cosmopolitan' - "belonging to all parts of the world"; "not 
restricted to any one country"; "free from national limitations or attachments" - 
to echo Marx and Engels' point in The Communist Manifesto: "The bourgeoisie 
has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character 
to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of 
Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on 
which it stood."24 The current state of globalization, mass migration and mass 
mediation has given to subalterns, more than ever, a de facto cosmopolitanism 
that should, I argue, be actively embraced in their political struggles. 
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Subordination is no respecter of borders - less so now than ever. But solidarities, 
too, may be imagined from a distance. What sorts of historical narrative might 
inspire new recognitions which would allow for a cosmopolitan articulation not 
only of resistance to subordination but also of a vision for its transcendence? I 
will suggest, in Part 11, some reasons for the lingering essentialisms to be found 
in the work of even the most committed historians-from-below and some analy- 
sis of their political implications; in Part 111, I will sketch out some possible 
directions from which to approach a cosmopolitan 'history from below,' arguing 
not for a celebration of difference but for an historical examination of differ- 
ence-producing practices.25 Such an approach will, I hope, encourage solidari- 
ties across previously naturalized social divides. It may offer what one commen- 
tator on Benjamin has referred to as "an enabling r e m e m b r a n ~ e . " ~ ~  
The different academic disciplines take these forms (the state, money, the 
family) as given and so contribute to their apparent solidity, and hence to the 
stability of capitalist society. To think scientifically is to criticise the disci- 
plines, to dissolve these forms, to understand them as forms.27 
Why is it that historiographies of all political commitments revert to nation- 
state belonging (or something similar) as their organizing principle? Why do 
'historians-from-below' nevertheless organize their work on the basis of social 
identities which are the outcomes of the very processes of power they criticize? 
In so doing, they reinforce essentialisms and foreclose a more cosmopolitan 
vision of, as Fox-Genovese and Genovese have put it, "who rides whom and 
Can we identify some of the difficulties facing those who would 
construe subaltern pasts in cosmopolitan ways? One set of challenges is struc- 
tural, and can be found in the methods of professional historiography, on the one 
hand, and in our emphasis on subaltern agency, often construed as resistance, on 
the other. Each of these factors leads the historian into the arms of the nation- 
state. A second set of challenges can be found in language: what might be called 
the 'curse of Babel,' that is, the limits to our linguistic competence beyond our 
native tongue, on the one hand, and the particular metaphors - those of blood 
and belonging - which frame so much of our understanding of pastness. The 
first two are challenges particular to the historian, while the second two affect 
historians, their readers, and political actors more generally. I will sketch out 
each of these in turn, with particular emphasis on the problems each poses for 
the emancipatory knowledge-politics of 'history from below.' 
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The professional practices and protocols of academic historiography have 
deep structuring effects on what we produce and disseminate (as well as what 
we 'consume'), even as we strive to be 'oppositional.' As de Certeau has put it, 
our professional community "is also a factory, its members distributed along 
assembly lines, subject to budgetary pressures (hence dependent on political 
decisions) and bound by the growing constraints of a sophisticated machinery 
(archival infrastructures, computers, publishers' demands, etc.)."29 One effect 
of these institutional constraints is that we are led again and again to the nation- 
state. This is true even when 'political history' is abandoned in favour of 'social 
history,' and even when a 'top down' perspective is replaced by one 'from the 
bottom up.' When, as Joan Scott puts it, archives "for many social historians ... 
are sacred places where one culls from documents 'facts' about the past,"30 the 
state's own implication in both the production and the retention of, and the grant- 
ing of access to, archival material puts the state squarely in the role of 'gate- 
keeper.' And whiIe Benedict Anderson mentioned the census, the map and the 
museum as vehicles for communicating the 'reality' - and eventually the 'natu- 
ralness' - of the state,31 all of the material produced, collected and reverentially 
stored by the state - court proceedings, tax rolls, war records, legislation, admin- 
istrative correspondence, colonial reports - serves to create the illusion that the 
state is both a necessary and a sufficient container for the lives of its citizens. 
And if there is a necessary tension between capitalism's national and transna- 
tional forms and forces, this tension is repressed in favour of the national in the 
institutional location of historical records. 
At least to the extent that the historian is limited to the archives of one 
nation-state, the role of the state in structuring possible histories goes a long way 
toward revealing the irony in Ernest Renan's remark that "progress in historical 
studies often constitutes a danger for nationality" in that it exposes the "deeds of 
violence which took place at the origin of all political formations." For even if 
all the 'facts' of that violence are recorded and maintained (which is often 
unlikely), their categorization and construal may code such 'violence' as heroic 
sacrifice, may label its victims as 'enemies,' and a generation may be more than 
enough to silence those who might remember it otherwise. This determines in 
fundamental ways the kinds of history that can be conceived of, much less real- 
ized. Then, as Homi Bhabha suggests, "being obliged to forget becomes the 
basis for remembering the nation."32 And while no set of records will be free of 
the play of power and interest, reading from more than one perspective at least 
encourages the recognition of the moral and political ambiguities of categoriza- 
tion and construal. 
What some would claim to be the 'raw material' of historiography is thus by 
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no means in an 'unprocessed' condition. It is embedded in particular institu- 
tional practices and in particular regimes of categorization. These all 'place' the 
social actors to whom they refer in particular ways, as they leave others with no 
'place' in history at all. To use Pierre Nora's noteworthy term, some actors 
command more "historical capital" than others.'"~ listen for echoes of the 
deeds and the voices of those who have been as deprived of social memory as 
they have been deprived of other social goods is to listen, as we have learned 
from Sherlock Holmes, for "the dog that didn't bark in the night."3J Moreover, 
this inequality of recorded presence may be even more striking between nation- 
states than within them. The subaltern Albanian may have left fewer print traces 
by far than the English handloom weaver. Is one's past more worthy of recall 
than the other's? Is one more revealing of exploitation, marginalization and 
harm? 
Even if we presume that national belonging is a (or the) crucial organizing 
principle for historical memory, however, changes in state boundaries present a 
problem. Three situations may arise: (1)  a region may not have a long history as 
a separate state (Belgium, for example);35 (2) the region may no longer exist as 
a state (Prussia, for example, or the Soviet Union); (3) the region may have been 
a sub-national unit within more than one state (Silesia, for example). And in all 
three of these cases, the very lack of those things that the state does so well - 
recordkeeping, counting - or their complexity and fragmentation - may make us 
long for the constraints of centrally imposed categories: at least then there would 
be something to deconstruct. It is far harder to be a historian of Silesia, say, than 
of England, and not just because you need both German and Polish. This is too 
bad, because important stories will be missed. 
But if we must work against the assumptions that states are homogeneous 
and that they last forever, we need also to subvert the assumption that actors are 
permanently 'stated.' Of course, we know that cross-border movement has been 
the rule rather than the exception throughout the period in which state borders 
have been important. The histories of such movements, however, tend to be 
structured as if the states were the subjects (or at least that any actors who 
happen to occupy their space were the subjects), instead of putting it the other 
way round: that the men and women are the subjects, in whatever state they 
happen to find themselves. The historical treatment of membership lost and 
membership gained curiously lacks a sense of the complexities and the conflicts 
of relationship these membership changes embody. Paul Gilroy meets this chal- 
lenge in The Black Atlantic, with what he calls "the image of ships in motion 
across the spaces between Europe, America, Africa and the Caribbean as a 
central organizing But if this work has met the call for ade-national- 
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ized subaltern history, a history of 'hybridity,' it may be seen to take us only part 
of the way to a genuinely cosmopolitan history from below. It is, I would argue, 
still vulnerable to essentialist  identification^.^' 
The state's role as gatekeeper with respect to traces of the past is especially 
crucial for 'history from below,' given that, in most places and times, the uneven 
distribution of literacy and leisure necessarily concentrates writing about one's 
self and one's group among the privileged classes. Subordinates have needed to 
provoke the interest of their superiors in order to find their way into the archive, 
and that 'interest' has been stimulated in necessarily patterned ways. While a 
great deal of very creative "brushing history against the grain" has been done by 
'historians-from-below' working with, for example, court records, we are 
ncverthcless left with the virtually unanswerable question, 'who has been kept 
from remembering what?' by the state's particular inscription of 'noteworthy' 
actors and events. And this brings us to the second challen, ~e to a more 
cosmopolitan history from below: the Left historian, like the state, takes a 
partic~llar interest in those who defy the state, who resist its impositions. That 
bve see promise where the state sees problems should not obscure the fact that 
our selections for attention mirror the state's own. In Conan Doyle's story, the 
"dog that didn't bark in the night" was silent, we might remember, because it 
knew the criminal and did not feel threatened by his presence.38 What might this 
suggest about the subalterns who aren't found in the archives of the state? 
Such an emphasis on resistance to the state, stemming not only from the 
availability of archival traces but also from thesretical understandings of social 
transformation and from the search for subaltern agency, may limit the political 
efficacy of history from below. It may not only restrict our sense of which subal- 
terns are interesting (as feminist historians have been arguing for a long time), 
but its focus on the 'counter-blows' from below rather than the blows from 
above may be ultimately disempowering. In focusing on what are, after all, 
losing propositions, we may celebrate failed actions at the expense of provoking 
more successful ones. And in our disappointment with those supine subalterns 
who don't resist, we may miss the opportunity to show just how those subordi- 
nates are laid low. 
The 'curse of Babel,' whereby our ability to master languages is painfully 
finite, means -given the demand for primary research - that the historian from 
below is likely to 'go below' in only one country or two, just as it means that the 
readers of history from below are likely to read works in only one language or 
two. The English-speaking historian is either restricted to English or to one of 
the European languages deemed 'central' to the Western experience, or is 
consigned to a ghettoized 'area,' with its own journal and its own section of book 
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reviews in more eclectic journals, the work to be circulated only among those in 
that 'area.' If one does the history of Bengal, for example, one may become a 
sort of honorary Bengali, sharing stories with those to whom they 'really' 
belong. That these Bengali stories might have something interesting and impor- 
tant to say to a historian of China is a question unlikely to be raised. Just why one 
of the British Marxist historians - Erie Hobsbawm - most notably did not 
restrict his histories to England or to any other nation-state is, I think, in part a 
function of his polyglot central European b a c k g r o ~ n d . ~ ~  And the effects of 
'Babel' can be found not only in limiting the stories we know and the compar- 
isons we are competent to make, but also in limiting the range and depth of our 
political identifications and those of our readers. In all of those cases where 
political and linguistic borders have been contested and contingent over long 
periods, for example, linguistic specialization can mean 'choosing a side' in 
very complex struggles of subordination and resistance. One illustration can be 
found in the striking contrast in English-language histories dealing with the 
Atlantic Coast of Central America, the so-called Miskito Coast, between those 
based on Spanish-language archives (in Spain or in national archives in Central 
America) and those based on English-language archives in Britain and the 
Caribbean. One's understanding of a host of political issues in Sandinista 
Nicaragua - of Marxist regimes' ability to understand the political aspirations of 
indigenous peoples, for instance, or of the local historical memories mobilized 
by the U.S. in the 'contra' war - will find strikingly different bases in these two 
bodies of work.40 
And while language in this literal sense serves to limit the horizons of histo- 
rians and political actors alike, one particular discourse in accounts of the past 
has, I would argue, a more insidious effect on our political affiliations. This 
discourse of pastness, both professional and popular, is typically based on 
metaphors of "blood and belonging." It is a language of genealogy, of 
"Abraham begat Isaac"; a language of inheritance, of 'legacy': the legacy, for 
example, of black slavery. When such language moves beyond descent, it is to 
the 'fictive descent' of the adopted child, the 'naturalized' citizen who may be 
'welcomed' into the family, but who will later pass on that belonging to his or 
her 'natural' descendants. Adoption thus does not replace the system of blood 
descent, but, in fact, sustains it. Moreover, this language is not simply some 
recent confounding of Weberian modernization: it has been part of the common 
talk of pastness in eras premodern, modern and postmodern. 
Modern political sociologists did, as we know, predict the disappearance of 
ethnicity as the social basis of politics, just as modern political philosophers 
once prescribed it. In a world based on universal rights and on popular sover- 
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eignty, citizens, freely communicating and associating, would contest and 
decide the tenns of their CO-existence. Political affiliations based on inheritance 
would give way to those based on interest and voluntary association, just as 
political institutions based on force would give way to those based on ascendant 
legitimation and consent. That things have not followed these predictions has 
been the focus of a great deal of recent analysis. What few seem to have noticed, 
however, is that histories have almost always been told in the language of blood 
and belonging. That there is an irony here, or at least a mystery, is suggested by 
this comment by an anthropologist: "Historicity ... is the nightmare of the ethno- 
grapher, the constant reminder that the groupings one tends to take for granted 
are human creations, changing results of past and present processes."" That 
historians themselves - despite the debates inspired by Hobsbawm and 
Ranger's Invetztion of Traditior~,~%nd despite theoretical challenges to the use 
of unexamined categories - forget just this result of historicity, should lead us to 
suspect that something powerful is afoot here: Appadurai, for example, may 
vividly describe deterritorialization but still writes about "genealogy"; 
Benjamin writes about "enslaved ancestors." 
And why does this matter? Since "a metaphorical concept can keep us from 
focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with the 
metaphor,"j3 such language, I would argue, encourages essentialism and natu- 
ralizes some forms of social solidarity (those based on descent) while it obscures 
the possibility and the value of others (ones based on similar experience). The 
language of blood and belonging limits not only what stories seem worth telling 
and hearing ("who are they to us?") but also what insights might be drawn from 
them (an emphasis on 'nature' obscures the uneven tenns and results of 
'nurture'). Essentialism always obscures the play of power. While I would argue 
that such renderings have always been politically harmful, the current global 
condition of mass migration and mass mediation (of 'virtual belonging') means 
that they are particularly so at our 'moment of danger.' 1 would argue, then, for 
a desanguinization in the language and the logic of historiography, and particu- 
larly of history from below. 
But the metaphors of organic connectedness have further effects in the self- 
understanding of 'historians-from-below,' who are, by virtue of their position as 
professional scholars, not themselves 'below.' Academic historians, after all, 
enjoy what one scholar has referred to as "the leisure of the theory class,"44 and 
claim subaltern status for themselves with some difficulty. But they may be, as 
it turns out, the daughters of silenced or marginalized women, the sons of 
factory workers, or the great-great-grandsons of slaves. Their own 'descent' 
may be understood to give them both the desire and the 'authority' to speak for 
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some particular subalterns. These ambivalences within the social location and 
the self-understanding of some 'historian-from-below,' I would argue, have 
served to blur the lines in their work between dominator/dominated, between 
oppressor/oppressed, in understandable but politically dangerous ways. 
Lawrence Grossberg has made this important point: 
According to identity politics, only direct experience can legitimate commit- 
ment and any other involvement is suspect. Without a theory of commitment 
which is somewhat independent of identity, it is impossible to understand the 
possibilities of active political opposition which transcends any specific iden- 
tity or local struggle.45 
I will argue for an approach to historiography which contributes to the 
conscientization of the historian as well as of her audience, one which opens up 
her own vision of her connection with her subjects and of the moral and politi- 
cal challenges which confront us. In doing the research and the writing, her own 
identifications and insights should change, as she hopes they will for her readers 
and for all those who might ultimately be influenced by her work. 
These four constraints on a cosmopolitan history from below - the profes- 
sional protocols of academic historiography, our emphasis on state-defined 
resistance as politically interesting, the limits to our linguistic skills, and our 
susceptibility to metaphors of 'blood and belonging' - lead us and our readers 
toward some social and political identifications and actions, while they lead us 
away from others. What might offer a different vantage point from which to 
intervene in the politics of historical knowledge? 
If respect for the condition of the homeless (or the racially or sexually 
oppressed) does not imply respect for the social processes creating homeless- 
ness (or racial or sexual oppression), then identity politics must operate at a 
dual level. A politics which seeks to eliminate the processes which give rise to 
a problem looks very different from a politics which merely seeks to give full 
play to differentiated identities once these have ari~en.~" 
What would a 'history from below' look like that does not restrict itself to 
national (or sub-national) boundaries? In what ways might the historian break 
the rules of professional respectability in order to inspire new solidarities, both 
for herself and for her readers? What language would such a history use, if not 
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the language of descent and biological likeness? I offer two related suggestions. 
First, we might emphasize comparative histories, but extend that genre (often 
limited in scope and sometimes disparaged by 'specialists') to what I would call 
'juxtaposiriorzal history.": This would place, side-by-side, several (or many) 
thematically related 'stories,' not a11 of which, of course, could be based on 
primary research. The stories might - in fact, should - come from a variety of 
times and places and be based on original work in a variety of languages, but 
should differ from standard comparative histories in offering inore stories in one 
place, and from standard works of synthesis in leaving far more open-ended the 
insights and conclusions to be drawn from the juxtapositions. Richard Vann has 
provided some interesting ideas on the relationship between narrative form and 
subalternity that might encourage such an approach. Long narrative forms, he 
says, belong to other classes. Neither the aristocratic epic nor the bourgeois 
novel have an analogue in the story-telling of ordinary people. "There is nothing 
in the genre," he says, "that would sustain an 800-page Making of the English 
Working Class B l ~ e s . " " ~  Acollection of 'short stories' may be more apt. 
Second, the 'key-words' according to which the 'thematic relations' would 
be established between the juxtaposed stories would be verbs rather than nouns. 
If, as James Clifford reminds us. identity is "a politics rather than an inheri- 
then it is the verbs of prior politics rather than the nouns of subsequent 
outcomes that can most fruitfully open up insight into more just social relations. 
And if, as Grossberg reminds us, politics is about "moving people from where 
they are,"jO this cannot be accomplished by celebrating a fixed identity. For 
example, rather than compare the historical experiences of women in several 
settings, or of indigenous peoples, or of unemployed men, or of imprisoned 
political dissidents, we mightjuxtapose stories of those who had been marginal- 
ized, or those who had been displaced, or those who had been tortured, or those 
who had been raped, or those who had been silenced, without respect to the 
standard organizing categories of gender, race, nationality or class. The histo- 
rian should look for such stories far beyond her normal 'beat' of place and period 
- a tough task given that indexing practices follow the very categories she is 
trying to transcend. It has been my experience that dramatically different 
patterns of identification and of commitment follow from these reorganizations 
of historical subjects and historical  question^.^^ 
What has the potential to surprise us, in a 'verb-based juxtapositional 
history from below,' is to see the relationship unsettled between stock stories, on 
the one hand, and stock characters, on the other. As one border-crosser between 
history and anthropology has put it, "We need to develop strategies for surpris- 
ing ourselves, for looking at our material against the light. This calls for a 
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constant scrutiny of the shopping lists and problem inventories we carry with 
uS.33s2 Someone sinzilar to me in what he has done and had done to him, rather 
than the same as me in her gender, race and class positions, will provide an imag- 
inative bridge to my membership in a collectivity of cosmopolitan solidarity.j3 
Articulating the bases of similarity across the global experience of subordina- 
tion should be the first task of those seeking to mobilize for a project that is 
genuinely counter-hegemonic and socially just. This will avoid two fatal 
hazards to an effective mobilization: essentialism and the exaggeration of 
agency. Subordinates have, after all, a deficit of agency. That's what makes them 
subordinates. 
The possible downside of juxtapositional history, as most historians would 
point out, is that the stories would be 'consumed' by the historian, and then rede- 
ployed, with what could at best be described as inadequate context. I would 
argue, however, that this very weakness could be a powerful political strength. 
As Benjamin has written, 
There is nothing that cornmends a story to memory more effectively than that 
chaste compactness which precludes psychological analysis. And the more 
natural the process by which the storyteller forgoes psychological shading, the 
greater becomes the story's claim to a place in the memory of the listener, the 
more completely is it integrated into his own experience, the greater will be his 
inclination to repeat it to someone else someday, sooner or later.54 
The more memorable it will be, too, for an audience beyond the typical 
readership of most historical monographs - fellow-historians who, it has been 
pointed out, are "unlikely, as a group, to bring about the changes we urge in the 
stories we tell."55 
If, as Richard Rorty argues, solidarity is "a matter of imaginative identifi- 
cation with the details of others' lives, rather than a recognition of something 
antecedently shared,"56 history from below can make important contributions to 
an emancipatory politics. This will only happen, however, as David Harvey 
urges, if such histories emphasize difference-producing practices themselves, 
rather than their outcomes in 'identities' or in static social locations. If this 
distinction has a familiar sound to socialists, reminding them of a well-under- 
stood emphasis on base rather than superstructure, on the material rather than 
the ideal, on the business end of things rather than on mere epiphenomena, that 
sense of recognition is not entirely misplaced. But note the verb here: reminding, 
not repeating. The differences which power produces, we now see clearly, can 
never be subsumed by 'class,' and the force with which they operate in our imag- 
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inations has as sharp an edge and as long a life as the most material of weapons. 
The  historian of emancipatory possibility may hope to interrupt those narratives 
of conformism which power-holders repeat and reinforce if, in juxtaposing 
subalterns' stories, she emulates Benjamin's ideal translator: "The basic error of 
the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to 
be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign 
tongue. ... He must expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign 
language."" Every account of subaltern harm, but particularly those we 
ourselves have not 'inherited,' may deepen our political language and sharpen 
our political praxis, if we but listen. 
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